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Background and aims: The aim of this paper is to examine the evidence and arguments in favor of prevention
paradox (PP) logic in the context of problem gambling. Evidence from recent studies of gambling and the distribution
of harm across lower and higher risk gamblers is reviewed to examine the contention that the absolute burden of harm
is greater in low-risk (LR) gamblers than the problem gamblers. Methods: The review examines a number of
methodological and conceptual concerns about existing evidence in support of the PP. Results: The principal
problems identiﬁed include the misclassiﬁcation of LR gamblers; the use of binary scoring method that understates
the frequency of harms in high-risk populations; a tendency to confuse behavior and harm; and the use of potentially
overly inclusive deﬁnitions of harm with low thresholds of severity. Discussion and conclusions: This paper makes a
number of recommendations for enhancement of this area of research, including the use of clear deﬁnitions of harm
and LR behavior and a greater focus on harm with material impacts on people’s quality of life.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1990s, there has been general acceptance of the
view that problem or pathological gambling can be examined
from a public health perspective (Korn & Shaffer, 1999;
Productivity Commission, 1999). Central to these approaches
is the assumption that the role of public policy should be to
reduce harm and to emphasize early intervention and preven-
tion rather than just the treatment of clinical cases. As with
other addictions, people affected by gambling are no longer
considered to fall into neat binary categories. Instead, refer-
ence is made to a “risk continuum.” A small percentage of
pathological cases will feature at one end (usually 0.5%–
1.0%), a group of moderately affected individuals (2%–3%)
will fall in the middle, and a larger low-risk (LR) population
will form the longer tail of the distribution. Such perspectives
usually assume some movement between categories. Some
people who start off as LRmay progress along the continuum
and develop difﬁculties with gambling; therefore, the aim of
good public policy is to prevent this progression. According-
ly, an extensive literature has developed that provides recom-
mendations concerning the best ways to prevent the
development of gambling-related harm. Such recommenda-
tions can range from reducing the accessibility of gambling,
changing the structural characteristics of activities, commu-
nity education to self-help guides (physical or online), which
encourage people to adopt safe and responsible gambling
practices (Ontario Problem Gambling Research Centre
[OPGRC], 2013; Productivity Commission, 2010).
Such approaches assume that investment in the welfare
and status of LR cases is preferred because of the ethical
responsibility of policy-makers to prevent harm before it
occurs. Another important consideration is that LR gamblers
greatly outnumber higher risk gamblers. Therefore, any-
thing which can be done to inﬂuence LR behavior may have
larger overall community beneﬁts and potentially be more
cost effective. Given this logic, it is not unsurprising to ﬁnd
that there are increasing references to the so-called “preven-
tion paradox” (PP) in the gambling literature. The term, ﬁrst
coined by Rose (1985, 1992), refers to the assumption that
the majority of cases of a disorder or disease (in absolute
numbers) arise in populations that only have an LR of that
disease, and that relatively few cases arise from smaller
high-risk populations. It is then assumed that interventions
that focus on LR populations have the potential to reduce
a much greater burden of harm and reach a greater number
of individuals than if the sole focus of public policy was
on high-risk individuals. The “paradox” arises because
most individuals affected by the intervention do not often
receive any meaningful beneﬁt and, in fact, may even be
inconvenienced.
When Rose (1985, 1992) proposed this notion and it was
adopted by others, the principal focus was on physical
diseases or disorders; and, in this context, the approach
appears entirely valid. Most, if not all, individuals in the
general population are at risk of harm from communicable
diseases (e.g., measles, mumps, and inﬂuenza). For this
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reason, directing attention toward population-level strate-
gies (e.g., immunization and sanitary practices) would
appear to have considerable beneﬁts. It would serve to
reduce future harm or clinical cases developing. There
would also be a strong argument that more cases of, for
example, inﬂuenza probably will emerge in the general
population than in smaller high-risk populations (which
might include pregnant women, the elderly, or vulnerable
infants in this context). Rose (1985, 1992) has similarly
extended such logic to disorders such as Down’s syndrome,
where it is thought that a focus on general populations of
women yields greater reductions in harm than if one were to
only focus on women with higher risk proﬁles.
PP logic appears to involve two lines of argument. The
ﬁrst is the view that the highest number of problem cases
should emerge from the larger lower risk population; the
second is that the burden of harm, and therefore, the beneﬁts
of intervention (or harm reduction) is greater in LR popula-
tions. Although both arguments would appear to be sound,
not all PP arguments or studies necessarily refer to both
arguments. Nor is evidence very often advanced to demon-
strate that one condition predicts the other. For example, it is
conceivable that there may be some disorders which have
few associated harms when they are not present. Thus,
while one might argue that currently LR populations have
the greatest pool of people from which clinical cases might
emerge in the future, it does not mean that the current
burden of harm is higher in those LR populations. For some
conditions, one is either a clinical case or not a clinical case.
However, alcohol use would appear to belong to a category
of disorders, where it is possible to place behavior on a
continuum where it is easier to identify individuals who are
less, moderately, and signiﬁcantly affected. For example,
Rossow and Romelsjö (2006) in Addiction reported a
Norwegian research which showed that the majority of
people who have experienced serious harms associated with
alcohol are in so-called low- to moderate-drinking popula-
tions as opposed to the top 10% of drinkers based on total
consumption. They showed that around 60% of alcohol-
related quarrels and over 50% of alcohol-related ﬁghts were
reported by people who drink at “lower-risk” volumes or
who reported getting intoxicated less frequently. They also
showed that at least 75% of hospital admissions for
suicide and violence did not involve the top 10% of
high-consumption drinkers.
METHODS
Accordingly, in several recent papers and reports, a question
has been raised as to whether a similar logic can be applied
to gambling and the harms associated with gambling
(Browne et al., 2016; Canale, Vieno, & Grifﬁths, 2016;
Raisamo, Makela, Salonen, & Lintonen, 2014). For exam-
ple, as Raisamo et al. (2014) argue, because gambling
occurs along a continuum “it seems necessary to consider
the harms experienced at any gambling involvement level
and among individuals who do not meet the criteria for
problem gambling” (p. 716). In the Raisamo et al.’s (2014)
study, data from a 2011 Finnish gambling prevalence study
(n = 4,484) were analyzed. Gamblers were classiﬁed into
groups based on the Problem Gambling Severity Index
(PGSI; Ferris & Wynne, 2001) and the prevalence of
different forms of gambling harm was assessed for problem,
moderate-risk, and LR gamblers. Harms included chasing
losses, feeling guilty about gambling, criticism by others,
health problems, ﬁnancial problems, borrowing money to
gamble, and other items. The results appeared to support the
PP argument. The study reported that 68% of cases of
feeling guilty about gambling were LR gamblers and ﬁgures
of 48% were obtained for “been criticized” and 53% for
“borrowing money.” Similar ﬁndings are reported by Canale
et al. (2016) in analyses based on the 2010 British Gambling
Prevalence Survey. Several different categories of harm
(dependence related, e.g., withdrawal or mood modiﬁcation,
and social, e.g., problems with spouse or other people) were
considered and the prevalence of these was cross-tabulated
by PGSI classiﬁcations. It was found that 62% of depen-
dence harms and 26% of social harms were among indivi-
duals classiﬁed as LR gamblers.
RESULTS
Although these ﬁgures appear to provide impressive support
for the PP argument, an identical problem is present in both
studies. The PGSI is usually scored so that totals of 1–2 are
considered LR gambling; scores of 3–7 indicate moderate-
risk gambling (people who are thought to be experiencing
some degree of gambling-related harm) (Ferris & Wynne,
2001). In both the Raisamo et al. (2014) and Canale et al.’s
(2016) studies, “LR gamblers” are classiﬁed based on scores
of 1–4. This is not consistent with the usual PGSI scoring
and clearly would have the effect of including higher risk
gamblers in the LR group. Thus, if a substantial proportion
of the positive instances of harm were from those who
scored 3 and 4 on PGSI (people who should usually be in the
moderate-risk group), then the harm percentages for LR
gamblers could be much lower. For example, in the Canale
et al.’s (2016) study, instead of 26% of social harm arising
from LR gambling, it might only be 10%. Similarly, in the
Raisamo’s (2014) study, the ﬁgure of 20% for health
problems and 5% for ﬁnancial problems associated with
gambling might be very low indeed once the moderate-risk
gamblers are removed from the LR group. Although the
authors conducted some validation analyses to ascertain that
there was evidence for concurrent and discriminant validity
for the groups based on the non-standard scoring, this still
does not deny the fact that the LR group was more likely to
have included gamblers who would usually be classiﬁed as
higher risk in other studies.
A second point to note with both of these studies is that it
is questionable whether some of the items identiﬁed are
really indicators of harm. For example, chasing losses,
gambling more to obtain the same excitement, or betting
more than one could afford are really behaviors that might
lead to harm if repeated too often. This ambiguity is borne
out, for example, in a study by Miller, Currie, Hodgins, and
Casey (2013), who conducted a Rasch analysis on items
from the PGSI. Feeling guilty, chasing losses, and betting
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more than one could afford were identiﬁed as being “typical
of low levels of gambling severity,” although a separate
appraisal of expert opinion indicated that chasing was
considered a higher risk indicator. These results very likely
reﬂect the fact that signiﬁcant chasing is known to be a
major aspect of problematic behavior, but it is also not
difﬁcult to understand how most gamblers (even LR ones)
might report at least occasionally going back to win after
having lost on a previous occasion. Similar arguments about
the validity of standardized instruments have been made by
Svetieva and Walker (2008), who argue that most items in
measures, such as the PGSI, are not really true measures of
harm. A third point relates to the use of binary scoring. In the
Canale et al.’s (2016) study, for a harm of a given kind
(e.g., social harm) to be registered, one only needed to have
reported occasionally having experienced one of four social
behaviors. Thus, a problem gambler who reported “always”
having experienced all four possible social harms would be
considered a positive instance of harm, but so would a LR
gambler who only reported one form of harm occasionally.
Similar criticisms of this nature are raised by Sinclair and
Sillanaukee (1993).
To date, the most comprehensive study of the prevalence
of harm in gamblers was undertaken in Australia by Browne
et al. (2016). In this study, 4,136 people completed the PGSI
as well as a 73-item harm scale that captured harm along a
number of different dimensions: decrements to the person’s
health; emotional and psychological distress; ﬁnancial dif-
ﬁculties, diverted ﬁnancial resources, bankruptcy, or reduc-
tion of ﬁnancial situation; reduced performance/loss of role
at employment or study; relationship conﬂict or breakdown;
and criminal activities. Cross-tabulation of harm categories
with PGSI classiﬁcations showed that harm was much more
prevalent as the level of gambling risk increased. However,
using PP logic, the authors argued that the burden of harm in
the community (in this case, the State of Victoria) is
disproportionately higher in LR gamblers due to their large
numbers. Further analysis is then presented using a health-
related quality of life analysis, which is a method designed
to estimate the burden of disease in terms of the number of
days of life lost per individual due to a disorder or disability.
The researchers argued that total years of life lost to
disability were 51,000 years for LR gamblers compared
with 35,000 for moderate risk and 15,000 for problem
gamblers.
The Browne et al.’s (2016) study is an improvement on
the earlier studies in that it uses the correct scoring for the
PGSI and includes a detailed and dedicated harm measure. It
also attempts to measure the impact of gambling-related
harm in terms of lost quality of life. However, it raises a
number of conceptual issues that need to be considered in
the PP arguments. The ﬁrst issue is to do with the nature of
the harms assessed. Gambling-related harm is usually
assumed to be serious. It refers to signiﬁcant disruptions
to a person’s psychological, social, legal, or ﬁnancial well-
being. Even if one believes that the harms identiﬁed in the
current DSM-5 classiﬁcation for gambling disorder are too
limited, it would still be reasonable to consider harm to refer
to something which causes some signiﬁcant reduction in a
person’s quality of life. One might refer to the current
World Health Organization (WHO) deﬁnition of healthy
functioning which refers to “a state of complete physical,
mental and social well-being” and argue that harm would
need to entail a meaningful deviation from this state of
being. In the alcohol research described earlier (Rossow &
Romelsjö, 2006), it is clear that genuinely harmful events
were central to the analysis. People were classiﬁed based on
the number of intoxication events and the outcomes were
alcohol-related quarrels and ﬁghts with others and hospital
admissions. In the Browne et al.’s (2016) research, the list of
73 harms range from very severe items relating to loss of
employment and bankruptcy to items such as: increased
credit card debt; less spending on other recreational activi-
ties, such as eating out; reduction in my savings; reductions
in my available spending money; and spending less time
attending non-gambling social events. Inspection of the
ﬁndings from this study shows that the percentage endorse-
ment of serious harms by LR gamblers was usually very
close to 0%, whereas the principal items where there was
modest endorsement (10%–30%) related largely to the
diversion of expenditure or the “opportunity cost” of
gambling.
A very similar conclusion was reached by Li, Browne,
Rawat, and Rockloff (2017) in Rasch modeling study of
5,597 gamblers and a hold-out sample used to validate the
modeling. Reduced spend on non-gambling leisure and
reduced disposable income from spending money on gam-
bling were the only “harms” that were reported by more than
5% of LR gamblers. In another study, Abbott, Bellringer,
Garrett, and Mundy-McPherson (2014) presented ﬁndings
from the national New Zealand prevalence study and
showed that a larger number of lower risk gamblers report-
ing betting “more than [they] could really afford to lose.”
However, it is important to observe that this item was only
endorsed “most of the time” or “always” by 0.2% of LR
gamblers and is NOT strictly speaking a harm item but a
measure of impaired control. Only 0.5% of LR gamblers
indicated that gambling caused “stress and anxiety” for them
“most of the time” and 4.2% said sometimes vs. 33% of LR
gamblers. Once again, these results do not provide strong
evidence of genuine cases of harm being more numerous in
LR populations.
A question, therefore, has to be raised as to whether
these are genuine forms of harm. If one were to spend more
money on shopping, subscribing to a new television chan-
nel, or going to sporting events, would not the same sorts
of harm occur? The danger here is that if one softens the
deﬁnition of harm, then it becomes possible to show that
harm occurs at any point at the continuum, and therefore,
the PP hypothesis becomes very easy to conﬁrm. However,
unlike in alcohol research, there is not a lot of evidence that
any LR gamblers are likely to be “harmed individuals” as a
result of these behaviors. For example, the research does
not show evidence of signiﬁcant binge gambling events in
LR groups commensurate with the alcohol research. Nor
does it show that the burden of signiﬁcant harm (e.
g., relationship difﬁculties) extends strongly into LR popu-
lations. A problem with such approaches is that harm is
considered to be something of a “liquid” quality. One can,
in effect, harvest small blocks of minor harm from LR
cases and then aggregate them and compare this block with
serious harm events. This is done by mapping harm to the
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number of days of quality of life lost or disability incurred.
But is this valid? Does it really make sense to aggregate
what are essentially minor and possibly incipient symp-
toms of a disorder and then compare these with a full
manifestation of the disorder? In effect, this becomes close
to arguing that a person who has one or two symptoms of a
disorder has some fraction of that disorder (e.g., 1/20 or
1/10, so that 10 × these individuals= 1 full disorder). How
similar is this to surveying a room of people and identify-
ing 50 who have some minor medical complaint (e.g., a
tickle in the nose) which is causing them minimal discom-
fort and then arguing that their total harm is equivalent to
the one person who has a full-blown head cold (and is
miserable)? Only one person very likely has genuine harm
of the nature that might make them (at least temporarily)
not fully functioning as according to the WHO deﬁnition.
In our view, the argument in favor of the PP would be
stronger if the focus remains on the extent to which
genuine harm extends into LR populations. Alternatively,
we would encourage researchers to focus on the
accumulation of minor harms, rather than to document to
putative harm associated with isolated low-severity harm
indicators.
DISCUSSION
If the evidence for a burden of harm among LR gamblers is
subject to criticism, this does not necessarily mean, however,
that the PP argument is without merit. The value of focusing
on lower risk populations is that they are large and may be the
source of a larger number of people who subsequently
become problem gamblers. Thus, it has been suggested that
broader policies which inﬂuence total consumption and
which reduce regular behavior may also reduce problem
gambling (PG) rates. Current evidence suggests that this
argument is generally sustainable when widespread liberal-
ization of gambling occurs, but the argument is less sustain-
able over time. As Abbott (2016) has pointed out, total
gambling consumption (in the form of overall participation
rates and expenditure) has fallen in many countries while PG
prevalence rates have stabilized. In some countries, PG rates
have remained the same or fallen, while total expenditure has
remained largely static or only been slightly increasing
(e.g., Australia and New Zealand). These trends have been
attributed to various factors: maturity of the market (e.g., the
activities have lost their novel appeal), responsible gambling
policies, or people adapting to gambling. However, these
trends also suggest that the argument in favor of policies that
target the larger population of gamblers to reduce PGmay not
necessarily be as strong as before. PG appears, to some
degree, to affect a small entrenched segment of the population
and, as Abbott (2016) has suggested, there may be particular
social and individual characteristics shared by those people
which make them particularly vulnerable. His argument
would, therefore, to some degree, imply some greater focus
on high risk or vulnerable populations rather than the existing
assumption that population-level changes (apart from a
dramatic reduction or ban on some forms of gambling,
e.g., electronic gaming machines) will inﬂuence PG rates.
Another way to test the PP argument is to consider
evidence from longitudinal survey studies that have tracked
the status of gamblers over time. If people are classiﬁed by
PGSI level, it is possible to ascertain what percentage of LR
gamblers progress to PG over time and the absolute numbers
of people involved when percentages are extrapolated to the
general population. A study of this nature has, for example,
been undertaken in the Australian State of Victoria, the same
location of the Browne et al.’s (2016) harm study, and
funded by the same organization (Victorian Responsible
Gambling Foundation, 2012). Evidence in support of the PP
argument is not strong in this study. For example, of 240 LR
gamblers identiﬁed in the 2009 wave of this study (LR =
5.77% of the total sample of 4,158), only one LR gambler
(0.42%) progressed to PG by 2010 as compared with 12% of
the moderate-risk gamblers (93 moderate-risk gamblers
were in the total sample). It is clear that, if such ﬁgures
were extrapolated to the general population, the number of
problem gamblers emerging from the moderate-risk cases
would be over 10 times higher. For the PP argument to be
more sustainable, one might need to examine whether LR
gamblers are more likely to transition to moderate-risk
gambling at ﬁrst instance (10% of gamblers in the Victorian
studies did this between Waves 2 and 3 of the study), but
evidence would need to be obtained to show that these
gamblers then progressed to PG over time rather than
transitioning back down to LR on the following wave.
CONCLUSIONS
The danger of overextending the PP argument is that it can
lead to an overreach of policy and regulation into lower risk
behaviors. Although it is valid to draw some parallels
between gambling and other potentially addictive behaviors
(e.g., smoking and alcohol), it is important to recognize that
low-level gambling is not the same as smoking. Smoking is
known to cause harm even at low levels. Similarly, there is
evidence that even those with lower levels of total alcohol
consumption engage in binge drinking on occasions. To
advance this area of research, we suggest that several
methodological and conceptual issues need to be consid-
ered. First, it is important to ensure that LR gamblers are
appropriately deﬁned and do not include people that other
studies would consider moderate-risk gamblers. Second, we
are not suggesting that measures, such as excessive expen-
diture or reducing one’s savings, are invalid items for
measuring harm. Such behaviors may indeed be a major
source of reduced quality of life for people, including some
problem gamblers. What we believe is that one needs to
consider some meaningful threshold for these behaviors and
that they are seen to reduce people’s quality of life or
compromise their psychological, physical, or social well-
being. Third, we caution against attempts to classify very
minor types of harm and then aggregate them. Such
approaches may lead to the PP becoming hard to falsify
in some cases because the threshold of harm becomes
lowered to the extent that it captures even the most minor
impacts. Fourth, we would encourage a focus on harms
rather than behaviors which may lead to harm: for example,
166 | Journal of Behavioral Addictions 6(2), pp. 163–167 (2017)
Delfabbro and King
chasing losses is not a harm, but a form of behavior. Fifth,
we would encourage the scrutiny of available longitudinal
data sets to look for evidence that documents the extent to
which problematic cases of gambling do indeed emerge
from LR populations over time. Finally, we should encour-
age approaches that examine the effects of the accumulation
of minor harms as opposed to minor harms in isolation.
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